1 00:00:00,920 --> 00:00:03,420 [speaker_0] Hello, my name is Samuel Shadrach. 2 00:00:04,420 --> 00:00:08,400 I am looking for a co-founder to leak information about the 3 00:00:08,460 --> 00:00:11,200 US AI companies and the US government. 4 00:00:12,040 --> 00:00:16,020 This plan is based on a mix of Eliezer Yudkowsky's worldview 5 00:00:16,260 --> 00:00:19,860 and Julian Assange's worldview. You can find their worldviews both, 6 00:00:19,940 --> 00:00:20,060 you know, 7 00:00:20,250 --> 00:00:21,840 online. There's a lot of writing about it. 8 00:00:23,260 --> 00:00:27,200 I want a political leader in the United States to 9 00:00:27,280 --> 00:00:30,860 obtain enough power to shut down the AI companies and 10 00:00:30,960 --> 00:00:32,119 pause AI research. 11 00:00:32,980 --> 00:00:36,280 In order to do this, they will have to oppose a lot of people 12 00:00:36,340 --> 00:00:36,760 who want to 13 00:00:36,820 --> 00:00:40,640 accelerate AI research. This includes people in the intelligence 14 00:00:40,720 --> 00:00:44,160 agencies, people in the executive branch, including, you know, the current 15 00:00:44,240 --> 00:00:47,240 president, people running various media houses, 16 00:00:47,380 --> 00:00:47,980 people running 17 00:00:48,020 --> 00:00:51,520 various lobby groups, people funding all of the people I listed 18 00:00:51,560 --> 00:00:51,920 up till 19 00:00:51,930 --> 00:00:54,860 now, you know, including the media, the lobby groups, intelligence and so on. 20 00:00:55,580 --> 00:00:59,160 I want to leak information about all of these enemies to the 21 00:00:59,200 --> 00:00:59,700 public. 22 00:01:01,920 --> 00:01:04,780 This rest of the video is just going to talk about, you know, 23 00:01:04,840 --> 00:01:05,900 like roughly 24 00:01:06,000 --> 00:01:07,040 maybe twenty minutes 25 00:01:07,900 --> 00:01:10,020 describing this plan in more detail. 26 00:01:10,180 --> 00:01:13,180 Before I describe the plan, I will give you some disclaimers. 27 00:01:13,780 --> 00:01:16,620 The biggest disclaimer is that all plans are fake. 28 00:01:17,960 --> 00:01:18,320 Like, 29 00:01:20,840 --> 00:01:24,000 over the next few months, I am going to do more stuff in the real 30 00:01:24,040 --> 00:01:24,700 world and figure 31 00:01:24,760 --> 00:01:26,640 out, you know, which parts of this plan make sense 32 00:01:26,680 --> 00:01:27,920 and which parts do not. 33 00:01:28,200 --> 00:01:31,460 I do not believe in, you know, figuring out a perfect plan from day one, 34 00:01:32,100 --> 00:01:35,800 and it just executes perfectly. I'm publishing incomplete hot 35 00:01:35,860 --> 00:01:39,600 takes and as, you know, we do stuff, we are going to 36 00:01:39,680 --> 00:01:41,580 find out, you know, what the actual plan is going to be. 37 00:01:42,960 --> 00:01:45,460 Uh, second disclaimer, so far I have been working, you know, 38 00:01:45,480 --> 00:01:46,680 all by myself, solo on 39 00:01:46,720 --> 00:01:50,560 this. If hypothetically you were a co-founder, you chose to work with 40 00:01:50,600 --> 00:01:53,380 me, then obviously your input is also valued in the plan. 41 00:01:53,580 --> 00:01:56,540 We will have to make the plan together. It won't just be me making it alone. 42 00:01:57,420 --> 00:01:58,960 So yeah, that's my other disclaimer. 43 00:02:00,180 --> 00:02:00,420 Cool. 44 00:02:02,720 --> 00:02:04,820 First, I will start with like my broader 45 00:02:04,920 --> 00:02:06,600 worldview, 46 00:02:06,660 --> 00:02:09,160 like not specific to this plan, but just what is my worldview, 47 00:02:09,180 --> 00:02:09,660 what do I think 48 00:02:09,699 --> 00:02:11,500 about politics, about life, about whatever. 49 00:02:11,650 --> 00:02:15,460 And from there you will get a sense of, okay, you know, why am I working on this? 50 00:02:16,500 --> 00:02:17,299 Yeah. So 51 00:02:18,720 --> 00:02:21,540 first of all, I agree with Eliezer Yudkowsky to a 52 00:02:21,600 --> 00:02:22,120 significant 53 00:02:22,180 --> 00:02:25,880 extent. I think there is a significant chance we will 54 00:02:26,020 --> 00:02:29,820 soon build an AI that is better than the best human experts at 55 00:02:30,200 --> 00:02:30,920 everything. 56 00:02:31,880 --> 00:02:34,600 Like every single task you can imagine, if you can imagine it, 57 00:02:34,640 --> 00:02:35,560 you can also imagine 58 00:02:35,600 --> 00:02:37,760 an AI that's better than the best humans on that task. 59 00:02:38,960 --> 00:02:41,620 Now, if we do this, it will be the most important event of 60 00:02:41,640 --> 00:02:42,340 human history. 61 00:02:42,540 --> 00:02:46,460 We will have literally, you know, a hard disk this big that will 62 00:02:46,500 --> 00:02:49,280 be capable of, you know, spawning an entire civilization from 63 00:02:49,400 --> 00:02:50,260 scratch with no 64 00:02:50,320 --> 00:02:51,100 human input. 65 00:02:53,220 --> 00:02:56,960 I think there's maybe a twenty-five percent chance we will get this by 2030. 66 00:02:57,400 --> 00:02:59,100 Uh, maybe forty percent chance we will get 67 00:02:59,140 --> 00:03:00,360 this by 2035. 68 00:03:01,580 --> 00:03:05,080 If we do build such a superintelligence, I think the most likely 69 00:03:05,160 --> 00:03:09,040 outcome is we will lose control of the superintelligence, as in we, the human 70 00:03:09,080 --> 00:03:12,360 race, will lose control of it, and literally everybody on Earth will die. 71 00:03:12,560 --> 00:03:14,540 I will die, you will die, your loved ones will die, 72 00:03:14,620 --> 00:03:15,360 everyone will die. 73 00:03:16,700 --> 00:03:20,280 Even if we did figure out how to keep a superintelligence in control, 74 00:03:20,660 --> 00:03:24,380 I think the most likely outcome is, you know, whoever was that person who 75 00:03:24,420 --> 00:03:27,860 managed to keep the superintelligence in their control, they will use it to rule 76 00:03:27,900 --> 00:03:31,260 the world forever. They will become, you know, permanent global dictator. 77 00:03:34,500 --> 00:03:34,860 Uh, 78 00:03:35,700 --> 00:03:38,920 in spite of all this, like as we know today, there 79 00:03:38,940 --> 00:03:39,600 are many people 80 00:03:39,640 --> 00:03:41,540 who want to accelerate AI research. 81 00:03:42,920 --> 00:03:45,840 There are many people in the US intelligence who want to accelerate AI 82 00:03:45,880 --> 00:03:46,520 research. 83 00:03:47,280 --> 00:03:50,520 I think people in US intelligence have had a lot of 84 00:03:50,580 --> 00:03:54,480 unaccountable power, like forever, at least on certain key 85 00:03:54,560 --> 00:03:56,850 domains, like whether to start wars, whether to, you know, 86 00:03:56,940 --> 00:03:58,060 race on key technology, 87 00:03:58,160 --> 00:03:59,460 whether to do surveillance, so on. 88 00:04:00,440 --> 00:04:04,300 So even if you could get fifty-one percent 89 00:04:04,520 --> 00:04:07,700 of the public, in this case the US public, to, you know, 90 00:04:08,580 --> 00:04:11,040 say, "Okay, we don't want AI to be accelerated at 91 00:04:11,080 --> 00:04:12,300 maximum pace," even if you could 92 00:04:12,360 --> 00:04:13,580 get that fifty-one percent, 93 00:04:14,760 --> 00:04:18,599 that may not actually get you a pause because, you know, the 94 00:04:18,700 --> 00:04:20,660 institutional structures are such that, you know, 95 00:04:21,660 --> 00:04:25,440 fifty-one percent is not enough. Like the people who run, 96 00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:28,780 uh, who are, are accelerating AI research are not 97 00:04:28,820 --> 00:04:30,300 that ac-acc-accountable to the 98 00:04:30,360 --> 00:04:30,880 public. 99 00:04:35,480 --> 00:04:39,300 Yeah. And ultimately, uh, now I think, okay, if you could leak information 100 00:04:39,340 --> 00:04:42,000 about these people, you can make them more accountable to the 101 00:04:42,080 --> 00:04:42,820 public, more 102 00:04:42,860 --> 00:04:46,440 ensure that, you know, the public will actually gets translated 103 00:04:46,520 --> 00:04:46,820 into, 104 00:04:46,860 --> 00:04:48,539 you know, decision-making in the real world. 105 00:04:51,300 --> 00:04:54,500 Okay. Some other plans which I have chosen not to work on. 106 00:04:55,240 --> 00:04:58,880 At some point, I did think about, okay, what if we could leak the information of 107 00:04:59,020 --> 00:05:02,420 everybody on the planet, not just, you know, people building AI? 108 00:05:03,180 --> 00:05:06,400 I now think that plan has a number of moral issues. 109 00:05:06,480 --> 00:05:10,040 I am not working on that plan. I'm now working specifically 110 00:05:10,180 --> 00:05:13,440 on leaking specific information about, you know, specific people who are 111 00:05:13,500 --> 00:05:15,020 accelerating AI research. That's it. 112 00:05:17,540 --> 00:05:20,100 I don't think I should try to become a billionaire. 113 00:05:20,340 --> 00:05:23,080 If I become a billionaire, I don't see how I'll be able to pause AI 114 00:05:23,120 --> 00:05:23,520 research. 115 00:05:23,560 --> 00:05:25,120 Like sure, there are things I can try, but 116 00:05:26,620 --> 00:05:28,440 like there's a very long road even from there. 117 00:05:28,480 --> 00:05:31,880 It's not like, okay, you get, you get power as a billionaire and, 118 00:05:31,900 --> 00:05:32,240 you know, then 119 00:05:32,280 --> 00:05:33,400 the world gets saved or something. 120 00:05:34,340 --> 00:05:38,130 I don't think I can become a politician because I fucking hate talking to 121 00:05:38,180 --> 00:05:39,550 people. I'm sorry. [chuckles] That is true. 122 00:05:40,340 --> 00:05:43,380 And I have learned this the hard way over the past one year. 123 00:05:43,520 --> 00:05:47,110 Uh, I still think somebody should try to, you know, persuade 124 00:05:47,440 --> 00:05:50,400 the public around risks from superintelligence. 125 00:05:50,540 --> 00:05:53,070 I just don't think I can become that political leader who will, you know, 126 00:05:53,100 --> 00:05:53,200 persuade 127 00:05:53,460 --> 00:05:54,240 millions of people. 128 00:05:56,780 --> 00:06:00,300 I think there are people in the past who have, you know, opposed, you know, 129 00:06:00,360 --> 00:06:02,920 billionaires, politicians, powerful people. 130 00:06:03,000 --> 00:06:05,280 In particular, there are like certain software developers who 131 00:06:05,300 --> 00:06:05,540 have, you know, 132 00:06:05,600 --> 00:06:06,920 become activists and 133 00:06:08,304 --> 00:06:11,784 And, you know, oppose these people, some of these software developers who have 134 00:06:11,884 --> 00:06:13,804 succeeded, they have succeeded because they 135 00:06:13,844 --> 00:06:15,584 were living in a different country from 136 00:06:15,644 --> 00:06:17,304 the country whose leaders they want to oppose. 137 00:06:18,004 --> 00:06:19,964 So, I mean, there are many examples you can take. 138 00:06:19,984 --> 00:06:22,774 For example, you know, like Sandra Albakyan who runs, you know, 139 00:06:22,784 --> 00:06:23,523 LibGen. 140 00:06:25,444 --> 00:06:25,644 Uh, 141 00:06:27,244 --> 00:06:29,024 sorry, uh, who runs SkyHub, 142 00:06:29,844 --> 00:06:33,164 who lives in, you know, Eastern Europe, which makes her more immune to, you know, 143 00:06:33,664 --> 00:06:37,044 uh, lawsuits from, you know, US, uh, 144 00:06:37,564 --> 00:06:40,284 academic publishers. I can give you many examples like this. 145 00:06:40,323 --> 00:06:41,624 You can go check them on my website. 146 00:06:42,504 --> 00:06:45,704 Yeah, so I think this plan of, okay, live in a different country from the 147 00:06:45,744 --> 00:06:46,004 country 148 00:06:46,044 --> 00:06:48,784 whose leaders you want to oppose, I think this plan still has some weight in 149 00:06:48,824 --> 00:06:49,024 it, 150 00:06:49,584 --> 00:06:51,384 and this seems like what I'll be doing. 151 00:06:53,264 --> 00:06:56,864 Lastly, I have typically, at least until recently, 152 00:06:56,984 --> 00:06:59,304 been, you know, kind of a believer in capitalism, 153 00:06:59,484 --> 00:07:00,324 in democracy. 154 00:07:01,564 --> 00:07:05,424 Uh, I believed, okay, like, you know, self-interested 155 00:07:05,444 --> 00:07:08,784 people run the world, but you can use structures to constrain 156 00:07:08,804 --> 00:07:08,984 their 157 00:07:09,024 --> 00:07:12,004 self-interest, and this can lead to good outcomes for 158 00:07:12,044 --> 00:07:12,704 society. 159 00:07:14,024 --> 00:07:16,724 However, now I'm not advocating just capitalism as 160 00:07:16,784 --> 00:07:17,724 usual, democracy as 161 00:07:17,764 --> 00:07:19,764 usual. I'm saying, okay, we need a mass movement. 162 00:07:19,824 --> 00:07:21,284 We need to, you know, overthrow these people. 163 00:07:21,384 --> 00:07:22,584 We need to pause AI research. 164 00:07:22,664 --> 00:07:25,104 Like, this is like radical shift from my earlier 165 00:07:25,164 --> 00:07:25,664 worldview. 166 00:07:26,784 --> 00:07:28,484 And like, yes, my opinions have changed. 167 00:07:29,804 --> 00:07:30,724 Uh, I... 168 00:07:31,544 --> 00:07:34,004 In theory, you can have a mass movement within, 169 00:07:34,084 --> 00:07:35,334 you know, pure democratic 170 00:07:35,444 --> 00:07:38,384 framework. In practice, I don't know what a mass movement will 171 00:07:38,444 --> 00:07:39,224 actually do. 172 00:07:39,324 --> 00:07:42,204 Mass movements can become violent. 173 00:07:42,264 --> 00:07:44,414 Mass movements can, you know, change an old form, 174 00:07:44,564 --> 00:07:45,404 structure of government and 175 00:07:45,444 --> 00:07:49,204 replace it with a new structure. Exactly what will happen once there is a 176 00:07:49,264 --> 00:07:50,904 mass movement, even I don't actually know. 177 00:07:51,724 --> 00:07:54,584 Uh, my opinion on this is this is not actually my problem. 178 00:07:54,924 --> 00:07:57,344 Uh, the people who are in fact leading the mass movement, 179 00:07:57,424 --> 00:07:58,264 this is their problem to 180 00:07:58,324 --> 00:08:01,184 deal with it, okay? If you did have millions of people who 181 00:08:01,244 --> 00:08:01,564 are, you know, 182 00:08:01,584 --> 00:08:05,484 protesting on the streets to pause AI research, what these people will do, 183 00:08:05,584 --> 00:08:07,084 what will happen after that, that is 184 00:08:07,944 --> 00:08:11,463 the problem of the peop- the leaders. That's not my problem personally. 185 00:08:13,964 --> 00:08:17,704 Cool. Next thing I want to talk about is the theory of change. 186 00:08:19,144 --> 00:08:21,034 I did briefly mention it. I will again mention it, 187 00:08:22,064 --> 00:08:25,774 uh, more clearly. The theory of change is simply that, 188 00:08:25,804 --> 00:08:29,444 okay, if the public knew everything about the 189 00:08:29,484 --> 00:08:30,884 leaders who are governing them, 190 00:08:32,084 --> 00:08:35,404 it becomes more likely that the leaders will do what the majority 191 00:08:35,424 --> 00:08:35,924 of the public 192 00:08:35,984 --> 00:08:36,864 actually wants. 193 00:08:38,504 --> 00:08:42,244 Uh, otherwise, typically what happens, leaders face multiple 194 00:08:42,484 --> 00:08:44,844 competing pressures. They face pressures to make money. 195 00:08:45,544 --> 00:08:48,584 They face pressures to win wars and defend their territory. 196 00:08:49,084 --> 00:08:52,804 They face pressures to win votes and get elected, which is quite 197 00:08:52,864 --> 00:08:55,484 closely related to, but not the same thing as, you know, 198 00:08:55,684 --> 00:08:56,404 doing what the public 199 00:08:56,444 --> 00:08:57,244 actually wants. 200 00:08:58,224 --> 00:09:01,424 Uh, right now, I just want to strengthen this pressure 201 00:09:01,544 --> 00:09:02,124 that, okay, 202 00:09:02,264 --> 00:09:06,144 leaders should have to actually get votes, win people's 203 00:09:06,184 --> 00:09:08,664 minds and hearts, and only then be able to do the thing. 204 00:09:09,664 --> 00:09:09,944 Uh, 205 00:09:11,044 --> 00:09:15,004 so basically, I want to make the, whatever, democratic pressure 206 00:09:15,164 --> 00:09:19,124 stronger as compared to, you know, market pressure or military pressure or 207 00:09:19,164 --> 00:09:19,524 whatever. 208 00:09:21,204 --> 00:09:24,224 Uh, there are many people in effectual circles 209 00:09:24,264 --> 00:09:25,164 in particular who have 210 00:09:25,184 --> 00:09:28,824 various theories of change. Uh, some of the theories of change 211 00:09:29,124 --> 00:09:32,984 often include, okay, identify who is powerful and then we will go side with 212 00:09:33,044 --> 00:09:33,944 them, ally with them. 213 00:09:35,044 --> 00:09:35,404 Uh, 214 00:09:36,444 --> 00:09:38,254 my theory of change is not this. My theory of change 215 00:09:38,284 --> 00:09:39,344 is not trying to be like, 216 00:09:39,404 --> 00:09:42,724 okay, let's find the specific, you know, powerful person and go persuade that guy 217 00:09:42,844 --> 00:09:46,643 or woman, whatever. My theory of change is, okay, if 218 00:09:46,744 --> 00:09:50,524 all the leaders' information was public, then those leaders actually don't have 219 00:09:50,564 --> 00:09:52,244 freedom to take independent decisions. 220 00:09:52,284 --> 00:09:55,984 They will have to do whatever the public wants out of them, and I think this is 221 00:09:56,004 --> 00:09:57,344 good in this case. 222 00:10:00,364 --> 00:10:03,064 Uh, maybe leaking information about them 223 00:10:03,104 --> 00:10:04,204 is enough to make them 224 00:10:04,244 --> 00:10:06,464 accountable. Maybe that is not actually enough. 225 00:10:06,484 --> 00:10:09,584 You need actual mass movement, actual, you know, people protesting. 226 00:10:10,644 --> 00:10:14,024 I do not actually know. I'm not sure. I think both are worth trying. 227 00:10:14,104 --> 00:10:16,984 Someone should try leaking information on these people and someone should try 228 00:10:17,044 --> 00:10:18,064 building a mass movement. 229 00:10:22,524 --> 00:10:22,704 Cool. 230 00:10:23,884 --> 00:10:25,424 Next section of this video. 231 00:10:26,244 --> 00:10:28,234 What is my motivation for working on this? 232 00:10:28,444 --> 00:10:31,354 So like, in my head, motivation is different, theory of change 233 00:10:31,364 --> 00:10:31,814 is different. 234 00:10:31,964 --> 00:10:35,424 Theory of change is, okay, if I do X, then Y will happen in the world, 235 00:10:35,504 --> 00:10:35,824 then A will 236 00:10:35,884 --> 00:10:37,894 happen, then B will happen. You can have your whole, you know, 237 00:10:38,224 --> 00:10:39,204 galaxy brain plan. 238 00:10:39,844 --> 00:10:42,824 Motivation is about what you feel, what are your emotions around this whole 239 00:10:42,864 --> 00:10:43,044 thing, 240 00:10:43,664 --> 00:10:46,724 and feelings don't have to be rational or justified by facts, whatever. 241 00:10:47,724 --> 00:10:49,524 So yeah, what is my motivation? What do I feel? 242 00:10:49,564 --> 00:10:52,024 Like, what are my feelings that are driving towards like, okay, 243 00:10:52,064 --> 00:10:52,764 you have to go work 244 00:10:52,784 --> 00:10:53,204 on this? 245 00:10:54,184 --> 00:10:57,544 I think my biggest motivation here, and I'm not actually sure if, you know, my 246 00:10:57,564 --> 00:11:01,504 motivations change with time or whatever, but I think my biggest motivation 247 00:11:01,564 --> 00:11:02,464 here is 248 00:11:03,444 --> 00:11:07,324 I don't want to die. I don't want, you know, everyone I care about 249 00:11:07,364 --> 00:11:08,484 to die. I 250 00:11:09,724 --> 00:11:13,224 don't want these people who are building superintelligence to kill me 251 00:11:13,264 --> 00:11:13,364 and 252 00:11:13,404 --> 00:11:17,264 everyone I care about. And if someone comes and, you know, 253 00:11:17,584 --> 00:11:19,994 tries to kill me, I'm willing to go pretty far to, you know, 254 00:11:20,024 --> 00:11:20,684 fucking fight that 255 00:11:20,764 --> 00:11:21,184 person. 256 00:11:22,064 --> 00:11:25,964 Uh, like take a hypothetical. Imagine, imagine this was not, you 257 00:11:25,984 --> 00:11:26,684 know, some random 258 00:11:27,664 --> 00:11:30,024 AIC or whatever. Imagine it was one of my friends. 259 00:11:30,364 --> 00:11:33,224 Tomorrow they decided, okay, they will build a bomb that bo- 260 00:11:33,364 --> 00:11:34,224 blows up everyone on 261 00:11:34,264 --> 00:11:37,864 the planet. Uh, they had some, you know, deranged beliefs. 262 00:11:37,924 --> 00:11:39,464 Oh, this will get us utopia, whatever. 263 00:11:40,124 --> 00:11:42,834 Uh, I don't buy those beliefs, but what in practice they're doing, 264 00:11:42,904 --> 00:11:43,044 they're 265 00:11:43,084 --> 00:11:46,064 literally spending day and night working on a bomb to blow up 266 00:11:46,084 --> 00:11:46,524 everyone 267 00:11:47,524 --> 00:11:51,504 and the plan to set it off. Now, I might like my friend, like I 268 00:11:51,564 --> 00:11:54,104 might like my friend for their honesty, for their courage. 269 00:11:54,204 --> 00:11:57,524 They might be, you know, high on openness to experience like me. 270 00:11:57,564 --> 00:12:01,144 They might be atheist. They might, you know, support technological progress. 271 00:12:01,184 --> 00:12:02,744 There may be various reasons I like my friend. 272 00:12:03,684 --> 00:12:06,024 But the fact that I like my friend is less important. 273 00:12:06,084 --> 00:12:08,544 The fact that they plan to fucking kill me is more important. 274 00:12:09,184 --> 00:12:11,533 And therefore, you know, if I have to go kill my friend, then, 275 00:12:11,604 --> 00:12:12,144 you know, I will do 276 00:12:12,224 --> 00:12:12,544 it. 277 00:12:13,484 --> 00:12:13,904 Uh- 278 00:12:15,732 --> 00:12:17,852 Now I have to caution a bit here, like, 279 00:12:19,172 --> 00:12:22,512 I am not saying, okay, we should just go, you know, kill everyone who's going to 280 00:12:22,532 --> 00:12:24,492 build ASI and that will fix the problem. 281 00:12:24,632 --> 00:12:26,752 Assassinations don't actually work. 282 00:12:26,952 --> 00:12:27,332 Like, 283 00:12:28,272 --> 00:12:30,072 I am not trying to assassinate people. 284 00:12:30,152 --> 00:12:33,892 I am not actively asking anyone to attempt an assassination either. 285 00:12:34,472 --> 00:12:38,092 However, emotionally in my head, I'm like, yeah, if we have to go that far, of 286 00:12:38,132 --> 00:12:40,552 course, we're going to go that far. Like, there's no question about it. 287 00:12:43,632 --> 00:12:46,992 Uh, this is my strongest motivation, but there are other motivations also. 288 00:12:47,052 --> 00:12:50,772 You can go look into the document I wrote for some of them. 289 00:12:50,892 --> 00:12:53,502 Uh, I often remind myself about the fact that, 290 00:12:53,552 --> 00:12:54,562 you know, if all this 291 00:12:54,632 --> 00:12:55,372 happens, if 292 00:12:56,252 --> 00:13:00,202 I am not crazy and this, you know, ASI gets built, you know, I am going to 293 00:13:00,272 --> 00:13:02,672 die. I have taken various steps to keep 294 00:13:02,732 --> 00:13:03,892 reminding myself I'm going to 295 00:13:03,952 --> 00:13:04,292 die. 296 00:13:05,912 --> 00:13:09,072 If I have to sacrifice myself and the world gets saved, you know, 297 00:13:09,112 --> 00:13:09,682 I am fine with 298 00:13:09,772 --> 00:13:10,142 that. 299 00:13:11,292 --> 00:13:14,672 I generally hate authority. That has always been a thing. 300 00:13:14,712 --> 00:13:18,652 This could be authority of parents or family, of religion, 301 00:13:18,752 --> 00:13:22,592 of governments, of educational systems, like any sort of authority. 302 00:13:23,552 --> 00:13:27,492 And I want the truth about, you know, what all these forms of authority 303 00:13:27,512 --> 00:13:30,712 are actually doing. Like, how does society function as a result of, 304 00:13:30,752 --> 00:13:31,002 you know, all 305 00:13:31,072 --> 00:13:32,972 this authority, all this pressure being exerted on people? 306 00:13:33,612 --> 00:13:36,972 I want the truth of all of this to come out publicly, and I have some hope, you 307 00:13:37,012 --> 00:13:37,112 know, 308 00:13:37,992 --> 00:13:41,892 if people are still alive, you know, in 10 years or 50 years, 100 309 00:13:41,932 --> 00:13:43,892 years from now, they can use all this information 310 00:13:43,932 --> 00:13:45,432 and they can design some better 311 00:13:45,492 --> 00:13:48,952 society for themselves, better than, you know, the current whatever we live in. 312 00:13:51,792 --> 00:13:55,692 Yeah, so I want the truth to come out. I am a very strong believer in the truth. 313 00:14:00,172 --> 00:14:02,712 Okay, some more motivations. Uh, 314 00:14:04,532 --> 00:14:08,112 I am not pretending to represent, you know, all of 315 00:14:08,132 --> 00:14:10,092 humanity's interests like some... 316 00:14:11,052 --> 00:14:14,012 I am some benevolent leader who, you know, accounts everyone's interests and 317 00:14:14,092 --> 00:14:16,892 calculates, you know, like in Yudkowsky's worldview, this 318 00:14:16,932 --> 00:14:18,012 is like a CEV. 319 00:14:18,932 --> 00:14:19,352 Uh, 320 00:14:20,932 --> 00:14:23,292 like there are different philosophies or different names for it, 321 00:14:23,352 --> 00:14:24,092 but like I'm not 322 00:14:24,152 --> 00:14:26,532 trying to say, "Oh, I am representing everyone's interests." I 323 00:14:26,551 --> 00:14:27,352 am here to represent 324 00:14:27,392 --> 00:14:28,912 my interests, which is I don't want to die 325 00:14:28,952 --> 00:14:30,072 and I don't want to live in a dead 326 00:14:30,132 --> 00:14:32,832 world. And you might also benefit from that. 327 00:14:32,892 --> 00:14:35,012 Like, if I save the world, you will also not die, 328 00:14:35,042 --> 00:14:36,272 and that's also in your benefit. 329 00:14:36,332 --> 00:14:40,092 But I am not, like, saying, "Oh, I will just 330 00:14:40,132 --> 00:14:43,972 defer to you on things." Like, I'm doing this because I want the world to 331 00:14:44,012 --> 00:14:44,092 be 332 00:14:44,112 --> 00:14:45,892 a certain way and not another way. 333 00:14:47,312 --> 00:14:50,332 Yeah, and many people say they are fine with human extinction. 334 00:14:50,912 --> 00:14:54,072 I think that some of them are wrong, but also it doesn't matter. 335 00:14:54,332 --> 00:14:56,632 You may be fine with it. I am not fine with it and, you know, 336 00:14:56,672 --> 00:14:57,312 I'm going to fight 337 00:14:57,352 --> 00:14:57,572 this. 338 00:15:01,212 --> 00:15:05,192 I am a huge fan of Naval Ravikant's quote that I 339 00:15:05,232 --> 00:15:07,852 should not just keep blaming other people that the world is ending. 340 00:15:07,932 --> 00:15:10,252 I should also, you know, take ownership of this problem 341 00:15:10,292 --> 00:15:10,982 and be like, you know, if 342 00:15:10,992 --> 00:15:12,432 the world ends, this is my fault as well. 343 00:15:12,572 --> 00:15:16,412 Like, I also should have done my best to prevent 344 00:15:16,452 --> 00:15:19,812 this from happening. And if I failed to, you know, do my best, I should also blame 345 00:15:19,852 --> 00:15:20,412 myself. 346 00:15:21,412 --> 00:15:23,732 And I, yeah, I buy that. 347 00:15:26,192 --> 00:15:26,692 Uh, 348 00:15:27,552 --> 00:15:31,392 a more self-interest, again, another reason, like, 349 00:15:32,752 --> 00:15:35,472 working alone on problems is, you know, 350 00:15:36,072 --> 00:15:37,172 demotivating. 351 00:15:38,012 --> 00:15:40,972 I don't want to become depressed. I think there is a small chance, 352 00:15:41,052 --> 00:15:41,592 not very big, 353 00:15:41,652 --> 00:15:44,972 but a small chance I will become depressed if I don't find anyone to work with 354 00:15:45,012 --> 00:15:48,112 this. So again, I would really like to work with someone 355 00:15:48,152 --> 00:15:48,672 on this. 356 00:15:49,892 --> 00:15:53,492 Uh, don't join just because, oh, Samuel's mental health or whatever. 357 00:15:53,572 --> 00:15:56,472 That is a bad reason to join. If you actually believe in this cause 358 00:15:56,512 --> 00:15:56,692 and you 359 00:15:56,732 --> 00:15:59,732 actually want to go all in, then you can come work with me. 360 00:16:02,232 --> 00:16:02,532 Uh, 361 00:16:03,732 --> 00:16:07,612 if I am going to die for whatever reason, be it due to ASI, be it for any other 362 00:16:07,621 --> 00:16:10,312 reason, like, I want people to remember that, okay, 363 00:16:10,392 --> 00:16:11,432 here are things I 364 00:16:11,452 --> 00:16:15,132 did that were beneficial for the 365 00:16:15,192 --> 00:16:18,612 world. Uh, I want people to remember my work after I 366 00:16:18,672 --> 00:16:18,952 die. 367 00:16:19,072 --> 00:16:21,032 I don't want to just die and be forgotten. 368 00:16:21,252 --> 00:16:22,892 I think that's another motivation I do have. 369 00:16:25,092 --> 00:16:28,892 So that I think concludes the section on, you know, what are my motivations, why am 370 00:16:28,932 --> 00:16:29,832 I working on this. 371 00:16:32,252 --> 00:16:35,612 Okay, next section, what will I not be working on? 372 00:16:36,512 --> 00:16:39,412 I am, like I said, I am not working on persuading people. 373 00:16:39,712 --> 00:16:41,492 My focus is on leaking information. 374 00:16:41,632 --> 00:16:45,012 Other people can work on persuading people that, you know, superintelligence is 375 00:16:45,052 --> 00:16:48,012 coming, the world is ending, you need to do something about it today. 376 00:16:50,132 --> 00:16:54,062 I am not working on sabotage. Sabotage means basically destroying other 377 00:16:54,112 --> 00:16:57,512 people's, uh, equipment, property, 378 00:16:57,852 --> 00:16:59,952 occasionally livelihood. But yeah, 379 00:17:00,892 --> 00:17:03,212 like, I don't think sabotaging AI companies 380 00:17:03,252 --> 00:17:04,372 is actually going to work. 381 00:17:04,481 --> 00:17:06,152 Again, there are too many people trying to build 382 00:17:06,212 --> 00:17:06,532 AI. 383 00:17:06,872 --> 00:17:07,092 Uh, 384 00:17:08,232 --> 00:17:09,592 if you just go, you know, 385 00:17:10,632 --> 00:17:14,492 destroy a few computers or something, be it by hacking, be it any means, like, 386 00:17:14,832 --> 00:17:17,952 this doesn't actually stop the AI race. There are too many people. 387 00:17:17,992 --> 00:17:19,892 There's too much money in this space. 388 00:17:20,752 --> 00:17:24,352 Like, if you actually, let's say, you know, blew up TSMC, I can see how that 389 00:17:24,412 --> 00:17:27,432 actually helps. But apart from that, I don't see how sabotage actually helps. 390 00:17:27,932 --> 00:17:29,692 Therefore, I am not working on sabotage. 391 00:17:30,312 --> 00:17:32,811 I am not working on assassinating anyone. 392 00:17:32,932 --> 00:17:34,772 Uh, I want to again make this clear. 393 00:17:34,832 --> 00:17:38,612 I don't think assassinating any one person is actually going to stop the AI race. 394 00:17:41,952 --> 00:17:42,252 Cool. 395 00:17:43,092 --> 00:17:46,152 Now I'm going to come to an important section on morality. 396 00:17:48,472 --> 00:17:51,152 Yeah, why am I talking about morality so much? 397 00:17:51,392 --> 00:17:55,272 Uh, well, firstly, because a lot of, you know, people in 398 00:17:55,452 --> 00:17:58,612 EA strong circles had issues with my moral worldview or whatever. 399 00:17:59,232 --> 00:18:03,172 But also because I think morality is one of the core things 400 00:18:03,252 --> 00:18:04,872 about a person, one of the core things 401 00:18:04,912 --> 00:18:06,552 that helps people to coordinate. 402 00:18:06,952 --> 00:18:07,212 Uh, 403 00:18:08,252 --> 00:18:12,072 if I'm trying to find more people to coordinate with me, it makes at least some 404 00:18:12,132 --> 00:18:13,932 sense for me to talk about morality. 405 00:18:14,132 --> 00:18:17,922 Also, the kind of plan we're working on, we will have to cross some moral lines, I 406 00:18:18,012 --> 00:18:20,002 think. Especially if we are crossing moral lines, 407 00:18:20,092 --> 00:18:21,152 we need to be careful about, 408 00:18:21,212 --> 00:18:23,232 okay, which lines we're crossing and why and so on. 409 00:18:26,242 --> 00:18:30,182 Yeah, my worldview on morality is I think, first of all, most writing on 410 00:18:30,222 --> 00:18:32,582 morality is kind of useless. It's just, 411 00:18:33,462 --> 00:18:35,082 yeah, like if you see like writings on moral 412 00:18:35,122 --> 00:18:36,462 philosophy and then what those people 413 00:18:36,482 --> 00:18:39,002 actually go do in the real life, like these are like two completely 414 00:18:39,062 --> 00:18:39,362 separate 415 00:18:39,422 --> 00:18:43,082 things. And therefore, I think most writing on morality is 416 00:18:43,182 --> 00:18:46,602 useless. Well, maybe useless is going too far. 417 00:18:46,622 --> 00:18:50,382 I would say not that useful. Like morality is something 418 00:18:50,422 --> 00:18:53,722 that's tested in practice, not in theory. I very strongly believe this. 419 00:18:54,662 --> 00:18:57,222 Uh, one thing I do believe about morality 420 00:18:57,322 --> 00:18:58,032 is that, 421 00:18:59,342 --> 00:19:01,762 and again, I'm not sure, but this is something I believe, like 422 00:19:01,842 --> 00:19:02,922 if you have had like 423 00:19:02,962 --> 00:19:06,522 a very nice life, like you've had a comfortable life where-- 424 00:19:06,562 --> 00:19:06,742 with 425 00:19:06,762 --> 00:19:08,742 people who you trust, with people you're happy with, 426 00:19:08,802 --> 00:19:10,722 like you will by default want 427 00:19:10,742 --> 00:19:12,101 to be nice to people all the time. 428 00:19:13,002 --> 00:19:16,311 I don't think being nice to people all the time is going to fix the problem of risk 429 00:19:16,322 --> 00:19:19,942 from superintelligence. I think some people need to be less nice 430 00:19:20,022 --> 00:19:20,222 to the 431 00:19:20,242 --> 00:19:22,662 people building superintelligence and, you know, go fight them. 432 00:19:23,802 --> 00:19:26,542 Uh, again, not physically fight them, but fight them in other means. 433 00:19:26,922 --> 00:19:27,042 Uh, 434 00:19:28,402 --> 00:19:32,142 so if you have had a very nice life, your default approach may or may not 435 00:19:32,182 --> 00:19:32,802 actually work. 436 00:19:33,602 --> 00:19:35,942 If you have suffered a lot in life, now you have a choice. 437 00:19:36,022 --> 00:19:39,842 Like you understand that, okay, when a situation comes, there is a 438 00:19:39,902 --> 00:19:42,542 more nice way of dealing with it and a less nice way of dealing with it. 439 00:19:43,482 --> 00:19:47,122 And I personally, I am not everyone, I am a specific person, I am 440 00:19:47,142 --> 00:19:51,092 sympathetic to the people who have suffered in the past and then therefore 441 00:19:51,142 --> 00:19:53,542 they understand that sometimes you have to take the less nice route. 442 00:19:53,582 --> 00:19:56,062 You can't always be nice and expect situations to get solved. 443 00:19:57,862 --> 00:20:00,922 I am sympathetic those-- to those people. I am one of those people. 444 00:20:01,222 --> 00:20:01,822 I might 445 00:20:02,622 --> 00:20:06,422 prefer working with someone like that who understands this 446 00:20:06,862 --> 00:20:08,042 fact about human nature. 447 00:20:10,302 --> 00:20:13,062 Uh, I think it's possible to go too far with 448 00:20:13,142 --> 00:20:13,322 this. 449 00:20:13,402 --> 00:20:15,102 Like, I don't want to become someone who 450 00:20:15,182 --> 00:20:17,202 full-time enjoys, you know, inflicting 451 00:20:17,242 --> 00:20:18,962 pain and suffering on my enemies. But 452 00:20:19,942 --> 00:20:22,052 like we need to understand our job is to inflict pain 453 00:20:22,062 --> 00:20:23,182 and suffering on our enemies. 454 00:20:23,262 --> 00:20:25,842 Like they need to lose power, we need to gain power. 455 00:20:29,702 --> 00:20:32,162 Uh, I don't think I'm alone in having 456 00:20:32,222 --> 00:20:33,502 understanding of this, you know, 457 00:20:33,542 --> 00:20:36,672 fact about human nature. I think many political leaders also have 458 00:20:36,702 --> 00:20:37,342 understood that 459 00:20:37,362 --> 00:20:39,862 sometimes you have to take, you know, the less nice route. 460 00:20:41,022 --> 00:20:44,682 Uh, examples, Winston Churchill, in my view, 461 00:20:44,742 --> 00:20:47,942 basically spent his entire career brainwashing teenagers to, you know, 462 00:20:47,982 --> 00:20:48,502 walk into 463 00:20:48,542 --> 00:20:50,162 their own deaths. And I think this is fine. 464 00:20:50,202 --> 00:20:52,322 He's still on the right side of history for me. 465 00:20:52,442 --> 00:20:54,742 Uh, Nelson Mandela's wife basically joined a 466 00:20:54,762 --> 00:20:56,092 terrorist organization to, you know, 467 00:20:56,122 --> 00:20:58,082 do attacks against the British. I 468 00:20:58,942 --> 00:21:01,342 think that was fine. She's on the right side of history. 469 00:21:01,522 --> 00:21:04,862 Was it all this most maximally effective and all that? I don't know. 470 00:21:04,942 --> 00:21:07,582 But like I think morally all this is okay. 471 00:21:08,282 --> 00:21:09,682 Uh, there were people who tried in 472 00:21:09,742 --> 00:21:10,722 assassinating Hitler. 473 00:21:10,822 --> 00:21:12,942 I support the people who tried assassinating Hitler. 474 00:21:13,562 --> 00:21:15,202 Uh, I respect all these people for 475 00:21:15,242 --> 00:21:16,982 understanding that sometimes you do need to 476 00:21:17,042 --> 00:21:17,941 actually go that far. 477 00:21:20,762 --> 00:21:22,342 Okay, so this is my thing on morality in 478 00:21:22,382 --> 00:21:22,742 general. 479 00:21:22,812 --> 00:21:25,422 Now applying it to the specific plan of leaking information. 480 00:21:25,482 --> 00:21:29,142 Like when it comes to leaking information, what are the specific moral 481 00:21:29,162 --> 00:21:33,072 decisions we have to make? Uh, first, who are we targeting? 482 00:21:33,302 --> 00:21:36,122 Second, what are we going to leak to the public? 483 00:21:36,182 --> 00:21:38,262 And third, what methods are we going to use? 484 00:21:39,442 --> 00:21:42,682 Okay, so the first one is easy. Uh, who are we targeting? 485 00:21:42,722 --> 00:21:46,102 For me, it's like, for me, the answer is everyone. It's a very broad umbrella. 486 00:21:46,302 --> 00:21:50,182 Like we can target anyone working at any of the USA companies, 487 00:21:50,242 --> 00:21:53,922 anyone working in the US intelligence community, anyone working in any of the 488 00:21:53,942 --> 00:21:57,642 political campaigns working to accelerate AI, anyone being 489 00:21:57,702 --> 00:22:00,062 funded, anyone who's funding any of these people. 490 00:22:00,502 --> 00:22:03,062 Like this could be senior people, junior people, 491 00:22:04,062 --> 00:22:06,702 people currently working, people previously working. 492 00:22:06,762 --> 00:22:09,682 Like the umbrella is very broad. Like for who are we targeting? 493 00:22:09,762 --> 00:22:13,242 I'm targeting everyone. Like I am fine with acquiring 494 00:22:13,302 --> 00:22:17,122 information on everyone, but I want to be selective about 495 00:22:17,162 --> 00:22:19,932 what information we leak. Like we can acquire a lot of information, 496 00:22:20,002 --> 00:22:20,422 but then what 497 00:22:20,442 --> 00:22:21,942 we leak to the public is a separate thing. 498 00:22:21,971 --> 00:22:23,162 There, I would like this to be a bit more 499 00:22:23,202 --> 00:22:23,622 selective. 500 00:22:25,502 --> 00:22:29,102 Now what-- Now comes question two, what information am I okay leaking to the 501 00:22:29,142 --> 00:22:31,722 public as opposed to, you know, we just acquire it, 502 00:22:31,782 --> 00:22:33,082 we kept it for ourselves, we 503 00:22:33,102 --> 00:22:33,942 don't do much with it? 504 00:22:35,502 --> 00:22:39,442 The short answer is I don't actually know what information we should be 505 00:22:39,482 --> 00:22:42,102 leaking to the public. Like the end goal is, okay, 506 00:22:42,162 --> 00:22:43,022 make all these leaders 507 00:22:43,042 --> 00:22:46,462 accountable to the public and, you know, stop the AI race. 508 00:22:47,542 --> 00:22:50,642 Now, in order to do that, what information should we leak such 509 00:22:50,722 --> 00:22:51,452 that this happens? 510 00:22:51,562 --> 00:22:54,442 I don't actually know. I have not yet done surveys. 511 00:22:54,662 --> 00:22:55,722 I just have some guesses 512 00:22:56,642 --> 00:22:59,242 based on, you know, my reading of previous leaks and so on. 513 00:23:00,322 --> 00:23:04,082 Uh, guess number one, I want, want to 514 00:23:04,142 --> 00:23:07,622 find out like why don't we have anti-AI 515 00:23:07,702 --> 00:23:09,862 political leaders already? Like 516 00:23:11,302 --> 00:23:14,722 already if you survey, you know, the public, it's like, you know, 50% 517 00:23:14,942 --> 00:23:18,542 pro-AI, 50% anti. So like half the public is anti-AI. 518 00:23:18,582 --> 00:23:20,602 Like why are there no leaders representing these people? 519 00:23:20,642 --> 00:23:24,282 Like, and why do they not have, you know, 50% of the political power if, you know, 520 00:23:24,462 --> 00:23:26,402 50% of the people are voting against AI? 521 00:23:27,242 --> 00:23:29,182 So I want to find out, you know, what are the pressures that 522 00:23:29,242 --> 00:23:30,722 are being put on all 523 00:23:30,762 --> 00:23:33,142 these anti-AI political leaders? 524 00:23:33,202 --> 00:23:37,102 Like why are these people not already in power? Like what is stopping them? 525 00:23:37,162 --> 00:23:37,362 Like 526 00:23:39,022 --> 00:23:42,222 are they being, you know, cut out from the relevant networks of 527 00:23:42,242 --> 00:23:42,882 elites? 528 00:23:43,102 --> 00:23:47,062 Do they not get funding? Do media houses refuse to work with them? 529 00:23:47,702 --> 00:23:50,212 Are they just being demoralized? Are they being, you know, 530 00:23:50,262 --> 00:23:51,142 physically threatened? 531 00:23:51,262 --> 00:23:54,122 Like what is stopping them? This is something I want to understand 532 00:23:54,202 --> 00:23:55,002 and also leak to 533 00:23:55,042 --> 00:23:55,662 the public. 534 00:23:56,502 --> 00:24:00,422 So a concrete example, in the 2016 US 535 00:24:00,502 --> 00:24:04,442 presidential election, uh, it was found out that people 536 00:24:04,482 --> 00:24:08,262 in the DNC were conspiring against Bernie Sanders in 537 00:24:08,322 --> 00:24:11,902 favor of Hillary Clinton. Uh, a hacker group basically got 538 00:24:12,022 --> 00:24:15,362 emails within people in the DNC, and they leaked these emails. 539 00:24:15,562 --> 00:24:18,402 And as a result, I think Hillary Clinton actually became 540 00:24:18,442 --> 00:24:19,122 less popular. 541 00:24:19,462 --> 00:24:21,862 Uh, Bernie Sanders, you know, became slightly more popular. 542 00:24:22,802 --> 00:24:24,842 Uh, I think this is an example of the type of 543 00:24:24,902 --> 00:24:26,582 thing I would want to leak. 544 00:24:26,642 --> 00:24:29,182 I would want to leak, you know, what are the pressures all these people 545 00:24:29,222 --> 00:24:29,762 are facing 546 00:24:29,982 --> 00:24:33,874 and why are they not able To come to power if they are actually, you 547 00:24:33,914 --> 00:24:35,374 know, representing people's interests. 548 00:24:37,334 --> 00:24:39,754 Second, I want to leak information about personal 549 00:24:39,814 --> 00:24:40,314 abuse. 550 00:24:40,814 --> 00:24:43,734 For example, Sam Altman has been accused of raping his 551 00:24:43,774 --> 00:24:44,254 sister. 552 00:24:44,514 --> 00:24:45,854 I don't know if that actually happened. 553 00:24:45,954 --> 00:24:49,874 However, if this actually happened, I want evidence about this to be leaked to 554 00:24:49,914 --> 00:24:50,474 the public. 555 00:24:52,094 --> 00:24:56,064 Uh, again, if you had enough-- if you had actual concrete evidence, you 556 00:24:56,074 --> 00:24:59,404 had enough people rallying around this, I think you actually can put powerful 557 00:24:59,494 --> 00:25:03,214 people in prison, even if, like, if they are, you know, rapists or, 558 00:25:04,314 --> 00:25:05,854 uh, similarly abusive. 559 00:25:06,694 --> 00:25:09,674 I think this can be done. Historic-- Like, doing this is hard. 560 00:25:09,734 --> 00:25:12,934 Like, you know, for example, you obviously know about the Epstein 561 00:25:12,994 --> 00:25:13,424 files, 562 00:25:13,514 --> 00:25:15,874 where there have been a lot of speculations, 563 00:25:15,974 --> 00:25:17,494 but not enough concrete evidence 564 00:25:17,554 --> 00:25:19,333 as to, you know, who is a rapist, who is not. 565 00:25:19,474 --> 00:25:22,974 If you had concrete evidence and you had, you know, public pressure, I still think 566 00:25:23,014 --> 00:25:24,454 you can put these people in prison. 567 00:25:25,834 --> 00:25:28,194 Third, I want to leak information about 568 00:25:28,254 --> 00:25:29,574 democratic safeguards being 569 00:25:29,614 --> 00:25:33,354 broken. So an example here, again, famous example 570 00:25:33,574 --> 00:25:35,254 would be when Edward Snowden, 571 00:25:36,074 --> 00:25:37,774 uh, talked about the NSA surveillance 572 00:25:37,834 --> 00:25:38,494 programs. 573 00:25:38,754 --> 00:25:42,474 He particularly talked about how various congressmen, various 574 00:25:42,494 --> 00:25:44,814 senators were not informed about these programs. 575 00:25:44,874 --> 00:25:47,934 He talked about how various Supreme Court judges were not informed about these 576 00:25:47,954 --> 00:25:51,074 programs. He talked about how secret courts were 577 00:25:51,084 --> 00:25:55,064 established, uh, so that you did not have to go through 578 00:25:55,064 --> 00:25:58,644 the official courts to, you know, get, you know, your warrant or whatever for the 579 00:25:58,734 --> 00:25:59,354 surveillance. 580 00:26:00,614 --> 00:26:02,644 By default, I'm expecting similar things 581 00:26:02,674 --> 00:26:03,714 are going to happen again. 582 00:26:03,814 --> 00:26:07,174 You know, the US AI companies and the US intelligence are going to make 583 00:26:07,194 --> 00:26:10,274 alliances and have-- and they could end up having some secret 584 00:26:10,284 --> 00:26:11,034 programs running. 585 00:26:11,074 --> 00:26:13,914 I would want to leak information about those secret programs. 586 00:26:16,054 --> 00:26:19,994 Uh, then I want to leak information about who 587 00:26:20,074 --> 00:26:22,794 in the AI companies is actually fine with human extinction. 588 00:26:23,614 --> 00:26:23,934 Like, 589 00:26:25,954 --> 00:26:29,754 supporting human extinction actively is very unpopular, 590 00:26:29,894 --> 00:26:31,894 and I want it to remain very unpopular. 591 00:26:32,274 --> 00:26:35,914 I want to leak information about, like, who's, you know, building 592 00:26:36,234 --> 00:26:40,213 ASI and secretly believes, okay, human extinction due to 593 00:26:40,294 --> 00:26:44,254 ASI is a good thing. Again, I don't want to punish free 594 00:26:44,394 --> 00:26:46,694 speech here. Like, you have an unpopular opinion, fine. 595 00:26:47,114 --> 00:26:50,434 But if you use that unpopular opinion to, you know, literally risk everyone's lives 596 00:26:50,474 --> 00:26:51,943 on Earth, then I want that to be leaked. 597 00:26:51,994 --> 00:26:54,034 That, okay, this is, you had this unpopular opinion, 598 00:26:54,074 --> 00:26:54,854 therefore you did it. 599 00:26:55,814 --> 00:26:59,704 So concrete example here, uh, Elon Musk has accused 600 00:26:59,834 --> 00:27:02,294 Larry Page of supporting human extinction. 601 00:27:03,374 --> 00:27:05,834 Uh, Larry Page has a controlling interest in 602 00:27:05,874 --> 00:27:06,734 Google and Google 603 00:27:06,774 --> 00:27:07,374 DeepMind. 604 00:27:08,574 --> 00:27:12,394 Jürgen Schmidhuber, uh, more or less supports human 605 00:27:12,434 --> 00:27:14,694 extinction. Again, he's waffly about his language, 606 00:27:14,794 --> 00:27:16,054 but he basically is fine with, 607 00:27:16,134 --> 00:27:18,014 you know, an AI takes over the civilization and, 608 00:27:18,094 --> 00:27:18,704 you know, humans are 609 00:27:19,014 --> 00:27:20,274 ir-irrelevant, blah, blah, blah. 610 00:27:21,134 --> 00:27:24,674 Uh, many of DeepMind's early employees, such as, you know, Shane Legg, such as 611 00:27:24,714 --> 00:27:28,154 Marcus Hutter, such as Seth Hochreiter, they were trained under Jürgen 612 00:27:28,194 --> 00:27:32,074 Schmidhuber. So if all of these people, you know, such as Shane 613 00:27:32,114 --> 00:27:35,114 Legg, such as Marcus Hutter, and so on, if they are all actually fine with human 614 00:27:35,174 --> 00:27:37,974 extinction, then I also want that information to reach the public. 615 00:27:38,474 --> 00:27:39,313 I want to leak that. 616 00:27:41,534 --> 00:27:43,174 Lastly, uh, 617 00:27:44,294 --> 00:27:47,194 if there are any, like, rogue groups who are trying to, you know, 618 00:27:47,494 --> 00:27:47,694 build 619 00:27:47,774 --> 00:27:51,714 superintelligence in secret, like, again, I would want to leak that also. 620 00:27:51,754 --> 00:27:54,754 Like, to pause AI, it's not enough to just have, like, a 621 00:27:54,774 --> 00:27:58,494 treaty signed by some leaders. You also need to enforce 622 00:27:58,574 --> 00:28:00,414 it. If there are people in secret trying to 623 00:28:00,454 --> 00:28:02,254 build, you know, ASI, I don't want them 624 00:28:02,294 --> 00:28:04,094 to build it in secret. I want to leak, okay, 625 00:28:04,174 --> 00:28:05,694 who's trying to build this in secret. 626 00:28:06,494 --> 00:28:08,484 Yeah, these are my guesses for what information 627 00:28:08,514 --> 00:28:09,164 we have to leak. 628 00:28:09,174 --> 00:28:11,214 But again, I will reiterate, I don't actually know. 629 00:28:11,274 --> 00:28:12,974 We are going to find this out as we go along. 630 00:28:13,874 --> 00:28:17,374 Uh, never in human history have we lived under 631 00:28:17,474 --> 00:28:17,714 fully 632 00:28:17,794 --> 00:28:21,094 transparent leadership. Leadership has always been secretive by 633 00:28:21,134 --> 00:28:21,674 default 634 00:28:22,594 --> 00:28:26,514 and unaccountable by default. Uh, today we have 635 00:28:26,574 --> 00:28:29,654 tools that enable, you know, less secrecy, more 636 00:28:29,704 --> 00:28:33,174 transparency, and maybe also more 637 00:28:33,214 --> 00:28:35,134 accountability, although that's kind of debated. 638 00:28:35,854 --> 00:28:39,194 So we are going to find this out as we go along, what leaks are actually the most 639 00:28:39,234 --> 00:28:39,684 useful. 640 00:28:41,634 --> 00:28:44,134 Okay, so I initially started with we need to 641 00:28:44,194 --> 00:28:45,614 make some moral decisions, like what 642 00:28:45,694 --> 00:28:48,554 information can we acquire? What do we leak? 643 00:28:48,814 --> 00:28:52,114 And what methods to be used? So what information we acquire, again, 644 00:28:52,194 --> 00:28:52,634 it's like we 645 00:28:52,674 --> 00:28:55,794 can acquire everything. What do we leak? 646 00:28:56,754 --> 00:28:59,884 Uh, my answer is I don't know, but here are my specific guesses of some 647 00:28:59,914 --> 00:29:00,354 information 648 00:29:00,394 --> 00:29:04,084 we, I think we should try to leak. Third comes what methods are we allowed to 649 00:29:04,154 --> 00:29:07,174 use? [coughs] Now, when it comes to what methods 650 00:29:07,214 --> 00:29:08,114 are we allowed to use, 651 00:29:08,214 --> 00:29:09,874 now, if you're trying to get information on 652 00:29:09,894 --> 00:29:11,194 someone, you have to break their 653 00:29:11,234 --> 00:29:14,234 security in some way. Now, typically this means either breaking 654 00:29:14,274 --> 00:29:15,194 physical security 655 00:29:15,434 --> 00:29:18,854 or cybersecurity, uh, more, more broadly information security. 656 00:29:18,874 --> 00:29:20,804 So physical security, information security, 657 00:29:21,034 --> 00:29:22,354 or you break their social circle. 658 00:29:23,494 --> 00:29:27,394 So example of breaking physical security would be, you know, the Pentagon Pizza 659 00:29:27,414 --> 00:29:27,914 Index, 660 00:29:29,014 --> 00:29:31,434 uh, [coughs] which was basically 661 00:29:32,574 --> 00:29:36,314 people found out that, okay, when a war is about to be declared, you know, 662 00:29:36,414 --> 00:29:40,174 people near the Pentagon order a lot of pizzas, and this shows up on Google 663 00:29:40,234 --> 00:29:43,154 Maps or whatever. So you can predict, okay, if a lot of pizzas 664 00:29:43,174 --> 00:29:43,664 are being ordered, 665 00:29:43,714 --> 00:29:45,814 probably a war is going to be, you know, ordered. 666 00:29:47,134 --> 00:29:49,674 Uh, another example is this famous 667 00:29:50,614 --> 00:29:53,514 Substack writer, Dominic Cummings, who worked under, 668 00:29:54,554 --> 00:29:58,194 like, worked, uh, during the Brexit political campaigns in 669 00:29:58,254 --> 00:29:58,314 the 670 00:29:58,394 --> 00:30:01,054 UK. He wrote about how he basically literally 671 00:30:01,064 --> 00:30:02,314 searched through the trash cans of 672 00:30:02,354 --> 00:30:04,614 his opponent, and he found the entire political campaign 673 00:30:04,674 --> 00:30:05,594 of his, you know, opponent 674 00:30:05,654 --> 00:30:08,614 in those trash cans. So these are examples of, you know, 675 00:30:08,674 --> 00:30:09,294 breaking physical 676 00:30:09,354 --> 00:30:11,354 security, where your 677 00:30:12,174 --> 00:30:15,774 enemy has left some, you know, clues, some trails, some information in physical 678 00:30:15,874 --> 00:30:18,894 space. Uh, there are more violent ways of this 679 00:30:18,914 --> 00:30:19,794 that the 680 00:30:19,854 --> 00:30:22,614 most violent is something like, you know, literally kidnap someone and get 681 00:30:22,654 --> 00:30:25,594 information out of them. I'm not very keen on doing that, 682 00:30:25,654 --> 00:30:26,594 at least to begin with. 683 00:30:26,834 --> 00:30:26,974 Uh, 684 00:30:27,954 --> 00:30:28,234 that's 685 00:30:29,054 --> 00:30:32,974 physical security. Next comes cybersecurity, information 686 00:30:33,034 --> 00:30:36,194 security. Uh, this means basically we hack into their 687 00:30:36,254 --> 00:30:36,934 servers, and we get 688 00:30:36,974 --> 00:30:38,034 information out of that 689 00:30:39,554 --> 00:30:43,294 Third, and what I'm actually have most hope about 690 00:30:43,354 --> 00:30:43,534 right 691 00:30:43,574 --> 00:30:45,534 now is breaking their social circle. 692 00:30:46,194 --> 00:30:49,434 Breaking social circle basically means find someone in their social circle who 693 00:30:49,454 --> 00:30:51,774 will, you know, turn against them and give us the information. 694 00:30:54,354 --> 00:30:57,474 Now, this has already historically been done by 695 00:30:57,534 --> 00:30:58,114 various, you know, 696 00:30:58,174 --> 00:31:01,734 journalists and, you know, OSINT, uh, open-source intelligence 697 00:31:01,794 --> 00:31:02,634 specialists. 698 00:31:03,934 --> 00:31:06,844 Uh, there are, at least today, there are now various media houses 699 00:31:06,874 --> 00:31:07,444 that work with, 700 00:31:07,494 --> 00:31:08,864 you know, OSINT specialists because they've 701 00:31:08,874 --> 00:31:10,064 understood this is how, you know, 702 00:31:10,114 --> 00:31:11,054 journalism works today. 703 00:31:11,974 --> 00:31:15,654 So OSINT includes everything from, you know, analyzing social media to, 704 00:31:15,674 --> 00:31:15,794 you know, 705 00:31:15,874 --> 00:31:19,774 building tools to dox people online, to, you know, analyzing flight data of, 706 00:31:19,834 --> 00:31:23,694 you know, flights, flights are public, to analyzing satellite data, to 707 00:31:23,794 --> 00:31:26,854 analyzing, you know, camera footage that's uploaded publicly. 708 00:31:27,474 --> 00:31:29,694 Like, just any information available online, 709 00:31:29,774 --> 00:31:31,434 try to analyze that, identify, you 710 00:31:31,474 --> 00:31:35,414 know, like who knows who, who did what when, who did what 711 00:31:35,474 --> 00:31:36,834 why, just get information. 712 00:31:38,314 --> 00:31:41,834 So this I want to work on. Uh, once we have this 713 00:31:41,854 --> 00:31:45,754 information, then you can do things like, okay, interview specific people 714 00:31:45,794 --> 00:31:48,234 and ask them to, you know, turn to your side. 715 00:31:48,354 --> 00:31:52,134 Now, to turn to y- turn them to your side, you need, y- typically, you 716 00:31:52,174 --> 00:31:54,614 either need to pay them money or, you know, 717 00:31:54,654 --> 00:31:56,034 they should have some ideological 718 00:31:56,194 --> 00:31:58,944 or personal motivation for, you know, giving you that information. 719 00:31:59,764 --> 00:32:03,404 So we can figure that stuff out. You know, can we build, you know, 720 00:32:03,454 --> 00:32:05,974 infrastructure to, you know, pay these people anonymously? 721 00:32:06,574 --> 00:32:09,574 Can we figure out, okay, whose writings are persuasive and then go, 722 00:32:09,614 --> 00:32:10,154 you know, DM 723 00:32:10,214 --> 00:32:14,084 that persuasive message to that specific insider and be like, 724 00:32:14,104 --> 00:32:17,274 "Okay, this is why you should, you know, give us the information." We can figure 725 00:32:17,294 --> 00:32:18,174 out stuff like this. 726 00:32:19,514 --> 00:32:21,974 And lastly, once we have an insider who's willing to, 727 00:32:22,034 --> 00:32:22,994 you know, turn on their 728 00:32:23,734 --> 00:32:25,414 circle and, you know, give us information, 729 00:32:26,394 --> 00:32:29,584 now how do they actually safely give this to us? Like, what is the tooling? 730 00:32:29,624 --> 00:32:31,274 What's the infrastructure required? 731 00:32:32,254 --> 00:32:35,014 Uh, for example, I have written a guide for whistleblowers. 732 00:32:35,074 --> 00:32:37,174 Like, if you are, you know, US government whistleblower, 733 00:32:37,234 --> 00:32:37,874 how do you safely 734 00:32:37,894 --> 00:32:41,054 whistleblow? I have written about how you can pay 735 00:32:41,134 --> 00:32:41,874 whistleblowers using 736 00:32:41,914 --> 00:32:45,754 cryptocurrency. I have written about, you know, what are the tools 737 00:32:45,814 --> 00:32:48,714 that you can use to redact information before publishing it. 738 00:32:48,804 --> 00:32:50,954 So like, once a whistleblower has some information, 739 00:32:51,614 --> 00:32:51,904 [coughs] 740 00:32:52,514 --> 00:32:54,374 they can't immediately just leak it. 741 00:32:54,434 --> 00:32:57,134 They need to sit and, like, redact certain pieces which are sensitive, 742 00:32:57,254 --> 00:32:57,514 and then 743 00:32:57,554 --> 00:33:00,414 only they can leak it. I've written about tools to make 744 00:33:00,434 --> 00:33:01,094 that easy. 745 00:33:01,494 --> 00:33:04,034 There's also stuff around, like, who will actually host this information? 746 00:33:04,094 --> 00:33:07,203 Like, whoever tries to host it, you know, puts it on their website or, uh, 747 00:33:07,294 --> 00:33:10,994 whatever, they again become a target. So make hosting easy. 748 00:33:12,014 --> 00:33:15,094 I think this all comes broadly around the social circle umbrella. 749 00:33:15,154 --> 00:33:18,814 How do we break, you know, security of, uh, people 750 00:33:18,834 --> 00:33:22,514 accelerating AI by, you know, getting someone in their social circle to 751 00:33:22,554 --> 00:33:22,694 turn 752 00:33:22,734 --> 00:33:23,274 against them. 753 00:33:25,294 --> 00:33:27,074 These are all the methods we have roughly. 754 00:33:27,154 --> 00:33:28,734 Now, which of these methods am I okay with, 755 00:33:28,814 --> 00:33:29,554 morally speaking? 756 00:33:31,454 --> 00:33:34,414 Uh, again, I don't have very strong hard lines here, 757 00:33:34,514 --> 00:33:35,254 but I 758 00:33:35,314 --> 00:33:38,744 generally lean towards approaches that are honest and not deceptive. 759 00:33:39,134 --> 00:33:39,494 Like, 760 00:33:40,734 --> 00:33:44,054 I care about honesty. I care about maintaining promises to our 761 00:33:44,094 --> 00:33:48,034 allies, which requires honesty. Like, if you're dishonest, why will people trust 762 00:33:48,094 --> 00:33:50,014 your promises? I care about honesty. 763 00:33:50,434 --> 00:33:53,074 Uh, I want the truth to come out in the long 764 00:33:53,134 --> 00:33:53,254 run. 765 00:33:53,314 --> 00:33:54,774 Like, the whole reason I'm doing this entire 766 00:33:54,834 --> 00:33:56,234 leaking thing in the first place is I 767 00:33:56,274 --> 00:33:57,834 want the truth to come out eventually. 768 00:33:58,634 --> 00:33:59,034 Uh, 769 00:34:00,374 --> 00:34:03,334 so it makes sense, like, okay, even if we are going to, you know, attack these 770 00:34:03,374 --> 00:34:05,134 people, I want to be honest about how we do it. 771 00:34:06,314 --> 00:34:09,874 I am less keen on things like social engineering, for example. 772 00:34:10,034 --> 00:34:12,734 Like, social engineering works, but I'm also not very keen on it for this 773 00:34:12,814 --> 00:34:13,154 reason. 774 00:34:14,114 --> 00:34:14,454 So I, 775 00:34:15,414 --> 00:34:19,214 I care about honesty. However, I am also okay with some 776 00:34:19,254 --> 00:34:23,014 amount of violence. I am okay with violating people's consent. 777 00:34:23,214 --> 00:34:25,074 I am okay with resisting authority. 778 00:34:25,434 --> 00:34:29,174 Like, we are not here to be nice. We are here to fight these people and win. 779 00:34:29,934 --> 00:34:33,734 So for example, if this means, you know, we hack into their servers, and this 780 00:34:33,994 --> 00:34:36,514 means we break their consent, and this means we get-- leak 781 00:34:36,554 --> 00:34:37,434 that information anyway, 782 00:34:37,494 --> 00:34:40,554 you know, I am fine with this. That's my short version of, okay, 783 00:34:40,574 --> 00:34:41,274 which methods am I 784 00:34:41,314 --> 00:34:41,914 fine with. Like, 785 00:34:43,134 --> 00:34:46,914 I am-- I want to be honest and keep promises, but I 786 00:34:46,934 --> 00:34:50,504 am okay with some amount of, you know, violence, some amount of, you know, 787 00:34:50,534 --> 00:34:51,834 violating people's consent. 788 00:34:52,974 --> 00:34:53,174 Yeah. 789 00:34:56,453 --> 00:34:58,854 And like, again, morality is personal. 790 00:34:58,953 --> 00:35:01,354 If you want to work with me, it's possible you have a different answer 791 00:35:01,374 --> 00:35:01,764 to me than, 792 00:35:01,974 --> 00:35:04,634 um, on this question. You can share your answer with me. 793 00:35:04,714 --> 00:35:06,474 We can, you know, debate about it, whatever. 794 00:35:06,494 --> 00:35:06,834 Like, 795 00:35:07,974 --> 00:35:09,884 this is all right now my personal opinions. 796 00:35:09,954 --> 00:35:12,634 Obviously, once we have, you know, more people working on such stuff, 797 00:35:12,714 --> 00:35:13,074 they will all 798 00:35:13,094 --> 00:35:14,854 have to take their own personal calls on, you know, 799 00:35:15,714 --> 00:35:16,774 how far are they willing to go. 800 00:35:23,054 --> 00:35:26,434 Cool. I think now I'll come broadly to the last 801 00:35:26,474 --> 00:35:29,274 section of this video, which roughly talks, okay, on 802 00:35:30,494 --> 00:35:34,294 who do I want to ally with? Like, more narrowly, okay, who 803 00:35:34,334 --> 00:35:37,153 should my co-founder be? More broadly, who should our allies be? 804 00:35:40,054 --> 00:35:43,054 Okay, so the first and most important allies are obviously, 805 00:35:43,154 --> 00:35:43,954 okay, who do I 806 00:35:44,014 --> 00:35:47,314 work with and where do they get funding from? So our funder has to be an ally. 807 00:35:47,654 --> 00:35:51,494 Now, I am not sure 808 00:35:51,554 --> 00:35:55,014 if there's any way to run this operation as a for-profit. Like, I have tried. 809 00:35:55,214 --> 00:35:55,254 I 810 00:35:56,394 --> 00:35:59,484 wish we could do this as a for-profit, but I'm not sure where we actually get the 811 00:35:59,534 --> 00:36:01,754 profit from. Uh, at least as of right now. 812 00:36:02,874 --> 00:36:05,014 Like, there are many ways of profiting from 813 00:36:05,054 --> 00:36:05,734 cyberattacks. 814 00:36:05,774 --> 00:36:07,474 However, most of those seem unethical. 815 00:36:07,554 --> 00:36:07,814 Like, 816 00:36:09,454 --> 00:36:11,774 like, I am okay targeting people who build 817 00:36:11,834 --> 00:36:13,374 superintelligence because, like I said, 818 00:36:13,434 --> 00:36:15,154 these people literally plan to kill me. 819 00:36:15,214 --> 00:36:18,034 You know, if they're planning to kill me, I'm fine with, okay, of course, we attack 820 00:36:18,074 --> 00:36:21,954 them in return. However, I'm not okay with, okay, we go, 821 00:36:22,034 --> 00:36:24,314 you know, attack some random strangers in some 822 00:36:24,374 --> 00:36:25,734 random country, like 823 00:36:25,774 --> 00:36:28,514 cyberattack them, and then, you know, like lock their computers 824 00:36:28,534 --> 00:36:29,354 and demand a crypto 825 00:36:29,394 --> 00:36:32,694 ransom or whatever. I'm not keen with that, on with that, 826 00:36:32,794 --> 00:36:33,134 that we go 827 00:36:33,194 --> 00:36:36,314 at-attack some random innocent people who have done something wrong. Who have... 828 00:36:36,374 --> 00:36:38,814 Sorry, that we go attack some random innocent 829 00:36:38,854 --> 00:36:39,874 people who have done nothing wrong. 830 00:36:39,974 --> 00:36:40,114 Like- 831 00:36:41,586 --> 00:36:44,206 I-- that seems to go a bit too far even for 832 00:36:44,266 --> 00:36:44,406 me. 833 00:36:44,866 --> 00:36:48,186 Uh, therefore, I'm not keen on profiting out of 834 00:36:48,206 --> 00:36:49,566 cyberattacks. Uh, 835 00:36:51,006 --> 00:36:53,046 otherwise you can profit out of, like, defense. 836 00:36:53,126 --> 00:36:56,026 Like, you can sell, you know, cyber defensive services to, you know, 837 00:36:56,226 --> 00:36:56,506 various 838 00:36:56,566 --> 00:36:58,226 corporates, to your own government. 839 00:36:59,046 --> 00:37:00,346 That I am okay with. 840 00:37:01,546 --> 00:37:03,146 So that could be a way we get profit. 841 00:37:03,266 --> 00:37:05,386 Otherwise, we just have to do this as a nonprofit. 842 00:37:05,626 --> 00:37:08,966 I think we can get funding as a nonprofit if we are actually competent. 843 00:37:09,086 --> 00:37:13,066 Like WikiLeaks at some point got over, you know, $25 million in 844 00:37:13,086 --> 00:37:13,995 crypto donations, 845 00:37:14,946 --> 00:37:16,366 which is 846 00:37:17,866 --> 00:37:20,246 not as much as, you know, like a billion-dollar tech company 847 00:37:20,266 --> 00:37:21,006 or whatever, but also 848 00:37:21,046 --> 00:37:24,126 that's a lot of money. So I think we can get funding even 849 00:37:24,146 --> 00:37:24,986 if we operate as a 850 00:37:25,046 --> 00:37:28,446 nonprofit, if we are actually competent, we are actually getting results. 851 00:37:30,386 --> 00:37:32,026 So yeah, the first person... 852 00:37:34,135 --> 00:37:37,786 [phone ringing] Sorry. Yeah. Yeah, so the first person I 853 00:37:37,826 --> 00:37:41,686 need, and, uh, I need to necessarily ally with is, 854 00:37:41,726 --> 00:37:44,406 okay, who are the people funding us? 855 00:37:44,496 --> 00:37:48,326 Another set of people who I think it will be important to ally with is people 856 00:37:48,366 --> 00:37:50,786 from our own country. At least they should give us some 857 00:37:50,826 --> 00:37:51,656 assurance they are not 858 00:37:51,686 --> 00:37:54,046 going to put us in prison for the things we are going to do. 859 00:37:55,126 --> 00:37:57,506 Now, when I say our country, which country do I mean? 860 00:37:57,746 --> 00:38:01,466 Now, as long as I'm with, living in India, by default, this means, you know, the 861 00:38:01,486 --> 00:38:03,046 Indian government and the Indian intelligence. 862 00:38:03,146 --> 00:38:06,926 If I can get some assurance from them that, okay, if I attack any 863 00:38:07,006 --> 00:38:10,246 US AI company, leak whatever, like Indian government won't put me in 864 00:38:10,286 --> 00:38:10,626 prison. 865 00:38:10,686 --> 00:38:12,726 Like if I can get that assurance, that would be nice. 866 00:38:16,066 --> 00:38:16,386 Uh, 867 00:38:17,686 --> 00:38:21,366 also, I'm not choosy. I'm not saying, "Okay, I will only ally with India here." 868 00:38:21,446 --> 00:38:21,726 Like, 869 00:38:22,806 --> 00:38:26,666 if tomorrow any of these countries, could be Russia, could be 870 00:38:26,706 --> 00:38:30,406 Israel, could be whatever, they were willing to 871 00:38:30,446 --> 00:38:33,326 work with me on this sort of stuff. They were 872 00:38:34,266 --> 00:38:36,406 willing to take, let's say, a strong stance. 873 00:38:36,456 --> 00:38:37,986 Okay, you know, superintelligence is bad. 874 00:38:38,066 --> 00:38:40,146 We will, you know, go against 875 00:38:41,006 --> 00:38:42,326 the people building superintelligence. 876 00:38:42,386 --> 00:38:44,426 If other countries are willing to take that stance, 877 00:38:44,506 --> 00:38:46,126 I can also go live in some 878 00:38:46,166 --> 00:38:47,266 other country. Like, 879 00:38:48,426 --> 00:38:50,446 there are some details here. They're kind of sensitive. 880 00:38:50,766 --> 00:38:50,946 Uh, 881 00:38:52,926 --> 00:38:54,086 but yeah, like 882 00:38:55,186 --> 00:38:59,026 the short answer is, yeah, I want to be living outside the US 883 00:38:59,046 --> 00:39:02,486 and like figure out a way to, you know, attack the US government, US AI companies, 884 00:39:02,626 --> 00:39:05,226 because they are the ones who are right now accelerating this race to 885 00:39:05,286 --> 00:39:05,446 build 886 00:39:05,486 --> 00:39:06,326 superintelligence. 887 00:39:09,046 --> 00:39:11,666 Uh, again, like for example, if I again go back to, you know, 888 00:39:11,706 --> 00:39:12,236 the WikiLeaks 889 00:39:12,306 --> 00:39:14,706 donation. Now WikiLeaks got $25 million in 890 00:39:14,726 --> 00:39:15,246 donations. 891 00:39:15,306 --> 00:39:17,426 Like, who did they actually get those donations 892 00:39:17,466 --> 00:39:18,666 from? We don't really know. 893 00:39:18,706 --> 00:39:21,686 Like some donors' names got leaked, but mostly we don't actually know now. 894 00:39:22,226 --> 00:39:24,366 This may have been some, you know, random American person. 895 00:39:24,426 --> 00:39:26,626 It may have been a Chinese person. It may have been a Russian person. 896 00:39:26,646 --> 00:39:28,046 We actually don't know. 897 00:39:30,986 --> 00:39:34,886 Uh, if I am working in India, I think I have more freedom to, you 898 00:39:34,906 --> 00:39:38,686 know, do things publicly. Like, I can be more public about what I'm 899 00:39:38,706 --> 00:39:42,566 doing. I can also be more independent of, you know, Indian formal, 900 00:39:42,806 --> 00:39:44,866 whatever, military chain of command, et cetera. 901 00:39:45,756 --> 00:39:48,586 And I think this is a good thing because people will trust us more. 902 00:39:48,726 --> 00:39:49,746 I will get feedback. 903 00:39:51,006 --> 00:39:54,226 But the downside is, yeah, so far I've not been able to find people 904 00:39:54,306 --> 00:39:54,906 to work with. 905 00:39:55,086 --> 00:39:57,725 If I can find people to work with in India, that would be great. 906 00:39:59,766 --> 00:40:03,386 If I hypothetically, again, this is strictly hypothetical, 907 00:40:03,746 --> 00:40:07,586 went to Russia to work on this, like I will be forced to be a lot 908 00:40:07,606 --> 00:40:10,526 more private about it, and I will be forced to be a lot less 909 00:40:10,586 --> 00:40:11,566 independent about 910 00:40:11,626 --> 00:40:11,866 it. 911 00:40:13,046 --> 00:40:16,726 Uh, if I hypothetically were to go live in Israel or something, 912 00:40:16,786 --> 00:40:18,526 obviously that has its own trade-offs again. 913 00:40:20,146 --> 00:40:24,116 What I do strongly feel though is that people who are living in the 914 00:40:24,126 --> 00:40:27,846 US, in the, in UK, in Western Europe, if any of you 915 00:40:27,906 --> 00:40:31,186 think you have protection when fighting against the US government, 916 00:40:31,366 --> 00:40:31,766 I think you are 917 00:40:31,786 --> 00:40:33,826 sorely mistaken, and you are going to regret it. 918 00:40:33,906 --> 00:40:36,966 Like worst case, you're going to pay for it with many years 919 00:40:37,146 --> 00:40:37,666 in prison. 920 00:40:38,626 --> 00:40:38,926 Uh, 921 00:40:40,206 --> 00:40:44,026 if you are living in, you know, Europe and you're planning these sorts of 922 00:40:44,086 --> 00:40:45,126 offensive actions, 923 00:40:46,046 --> 00:40:49,666 you should probably leave Europe is my guess. But there are details there. 924 00:40:49,846 --> 00:40:52,046 I don't want to get into that. 925 00:40:56,166 --> 00:40:57,966 Yeah, so the, again, coming back to allies. 926 00:40:58,106 --> 00:41:00,176 The first ally is, okay, people who can give us funding. 927 00:41:00,265 --> 00:41:02,736 Second ally is, okay, if our own country can protect us, 928 00:41:02,806 --> 00:41:03,606 that would be nice. 929 00:41:08,086 --> 00:41:11,886 Uh, a third set of allies, it would be nice if we, there are some 930 00:41:11,926 --> 00:41:15,026 insiders in the US AI companies and the US government who will work with 931 00:41:15,106 --> 00:41:15,306 us. 932 00:41:15,366 --> 00:41:18,626 Like this is not like absolutely essential, but it would be nice 933 00:41:18,686 --> 00:41:19,306 if we had people 934 00:41:19,326 --> 00:41:19,806 like this. 935 00:41:21,646 --> 00:41:24,966 Uh, it would be nice if there are people outside our organization who 936 00:41:25,026 --> 00:41:25,486 are giving us 937 00:41:25,506 --> 00:41:27,566 good feedback. Like most feedback 938 00:41:28,446 --> 00:41:31,526 tends to suck. Like most people have no context shared 939 00:41:31,566 --> 00:41:31,866 with you. 940 00:41:31,926 --> 00:41:35,835 They don't understand the constraints you're operating with, but at least 941 00:41:35,835 --> 00:41:39,246 some feedback would be useful, and that feedback is important, 942 00:41:39,826 --> 00:41:41,905 and I want at least some people to be giving us feedback. 943 00:41:41,966 --> 00:41:44,525 I don't want to be just completely isolated from the rest of society. 944 00:41:46,486 --> 00:41:46,866 Uh, 945 00:41:47,806 --> 00:41:50,646 example of feedback. I previously said I don't actually know 946 00:41:50,666 --> 00:41:51,506 which leaks will help 947 00:41:51,526 --> 00:41:54,965 versus will not help. Like I have guesses, but I'm not sure. 948 00:41:55,006 --> 00:41:58,866 If someone is very skilled at politics, they know, okay, these leaks 949 00:41:58,886 --> 00:42:01,786 will specifically help. You know, I want that sort of feedback. 950 00:42:01,846 --> 00:42:02,526 Like I want to know. 951 00:42:03,426 --> 00:42:05,525 So I also want that sort of ally. 952 00:42:06,946 --> 00:42:10,806 Okay, allies who I don't want. I don't want to ally with any media house. 953 00:42:11,306 --> 00:42:13,746 Uh, I don't want to ally with people who will 954 00:42:13,786 --> 00:42:14,886 help us with recruiting. 955 00:42:15,986 --> 00:42:17,186 I have reasons, but yeah. 956 00:42:18,066 --> 00:42:20,746 Like I want a small team that actually has a mission 957 00:42:20,786 --> 00:42:21,806 and can actually do what it 958 00:42:21,846 --> 00:42:25,786 takes rather than, okay, broad group of alliance of people who have 959 00:42:25,826 --> 00:42:28,446 network and blah, blah, blah, but don't actually do anything. 960 00:42:32,366 --> 00:42:36,106 Yeah. Also, who will respect us? Like we are planning to, or at least I 961 00:42:36,206 --> 00:42:40,086 am and people I want to work with, are planning to do something 962 00:42:40,126 --> 00:42:43,506 at least somewhat radical. Like not everyone is going to respect us. 963 00:42:43,586 --> 00:42:45,946 Not everyone is going to like us for the fact that we're doing this. 964 00:42:47,110 --> 00:42:51,050 Some people will respect us. In general, again, this is a guess, I 965 00:42:51,110 --> 00:42:53,330 don't know, but my guess from limited number of 966 00:42:53,370 --> 00:42:54,090 conversations, 967 00:42:54,750 --> 00:42:58,450 people who value power more are going to respect us more in general. 968 00:42:58,970 --> 00:43:02,390 So like some tech founders will respect us, some billionaires will respect us, 969 00:43:02,510 --> 00:43:02,649 some 970 00:43:02,690 --> 00:43:06,190 politicians will respect us, some social media influencers will respect 971 00:43:06,270 --> 00:43:06,630 us, some 972 00:43:06,830 --> 00:43:10,170 actors will, like, respect us, some libertarians will respect us, some, 973 00:43:10,250 --> 00:43:10,370 you know, 974 00:43:10,430 --> 00:43:13,110 more radical-leaning leftists will respect us. 975 00:43:14,710 --> 00:43:17,990 People who value power less will tend to respect us less. 976 00:43:18,690 --> 00:43:21,630 Uh, or people who value, you know, knowledge and truth less, 977 00:43:21,750 --> 00:43:22,250 they will tend to 978 00:43:22,270 --> 00:43:25,730 respect us less. Now, I think religious people will respect us 979 00:43:25,790 --> 00:43:26,080 less, 980 00:43:26,270 --> 00:43:29,790 uh, liberals will respect us less, people without any strong political 981 00:43:29,830 --> 00:43:30,170 opinion 982 00:43:30,190 --> 00:43:31,370 will respect us less. 983 00:43:32,490 --> 00:43:32,790 Uh, 984 00:43:36,010 --> 00:43:38,570 and like that's just a thing. This is not something I can choose. 985 00:43:38,650 --> 00:43:41,070 This is just a fact about reality. Some people will like us more 986 00:43:41,090 --> 00:43:41,580 and some people 987 00:43:41,590 --> 00:43:44,299 will hate us for what we're doing, and that's just it. 988 00:43:46,890 --> 00:43:50,590 Uh, if we do succeed, I think we will inspire more people to do 989 00:43:50,630 --> 00:43:50,869 similar 990 00:43:50,910 --> 00:43:54,850 things like this. Like, I am inspired by, you know, long chain of people, 991 00:43:54,950 --> 00:43:58,750 many of which were broadly part of the cypherpunk activist movement. 992 00:43:59,650 --> 00:43:59,970 Uh, 993 00:44:01,050 --> 00:44:03,110 if I succeed, I will go inspire more people. 994 00:44:03,450 --> 00:44:04,530 That will happen. 995 00:44:04,610 --> 00:44:04,850 Like, 996 00:44:05,690 --> 00:44:08,010 I will prove that, like, you can just go do things. 997 00:44:08,190 --> 00:44:08,510 Like, 998 00:44:10,470 --> 00:44:13,510 a lot of people are pessimistic about their ability to, you know, 999 00:44:13,570 --> 00:44:14,370 change society in 1000 00:44:14,390 --> 00:44:17,440 some very big way. Like, I have talked to many people like this. 1001 00:44:17,510 --> 00:44:20,810 This is, like, not some-- a very rare or unique thing. 1002 00:44:20,890 --> 00:44:23,440 Most people are pessimistic about their ability to inf-- 1003 00:44:23,470 --> 00:44:24,810 affect large scale society 1004 00:44:25,050 --> 00:44:28,390 changes. So if we can succeed at all, this, you know, 1005 00:44:29,270 --> 00:44:32,610 can help make them more optimistic that they can also go do something. 1006 00:44:38,590 --> 00:44:42,250 If you're still watching this video by now, you already probably have a decent 1007 00:44:42,330 --> 00:44:43,910 idea, do you actually want to work with me on 1008 00:44:43,970 --> 00:44:44,530 this or not? 1009 00:44:44,610 --> 00:44:47,850 Like, but yeah, again, I will just reiterate if this 1010 00:44:47,870 --> 00:44:48,510 is not already 1011 00:44:48,570 --> 00:44:49,370 clear, like, 1012 00:44:50,590 --> 00:44:54,470 yeah, I prefer honesty. I prefer, like, we 1013 00:44:54,510 --> 00:44:56,810 are okay with little bit violent approach, too. 1014 00:44:57,170 --> 00:45:00,590 So if you are okay with little bit violent approach, too, then you should work with 1015 00:45:00,630 --> 00:45:00,830 me. 1016 00:45:01,970 --> 00:45:05,730 If you believe superintelligence is coming, the 1017 00:45:05,770 --> 00:45:09,610 world may be ending, especially if you have emotionally internalized this, 1018 00:45:09,710 --> 00:45:12,190 again, that's a good signal that you should be working with me. 1019 00:45:13,110 --> 00:45:16,390 If you value power, that's a signal you should work with me. 1020 00:45:17,090 --> 00:45:19,870 If you understand that the world is run by self-interest, 1021 00:45:21,090 --> 00:45:24,450 uh, and systems that constrain self-interest, 1022 00:45:24,610 --> 00:45:25,070 that is again 1023 00:45:25,150 --> 00:45:26,210 a signal you should work with me. 1024 00:45:27,550 --> 00:45:30,090 In terms of, like, competence, uh, 1025 00:45:32,490 --> 00:45:36,070 I am personally good at generalist research and creating new 1026 00:45:36,130 --> 00:45:38,710 ideas. Like, again, I'm not saying I'm some, you know, 1027 00:45:38,720 --> 00:45:39,650 world expert or anything. 1028 00:45:39,710 --> 00:45:42,150 I'm not. But I think that's what I'm good at. 1029 00:45:43,090 --> 00:45:46,750 I am also decent at software development. Again, I'm not an expert at that. 1030 00:45:47,030 --> 00:45:50,950 Like, I have built multiple apps. I've worked on multiple scraping projects. 1031 00:45:51,230 --> 00:45:53,990 I have some decent understanding of how OpSec works. 1032 00:45:56,730 --> 00:46:00,500 I am willing to upskill in cybersecurity, so I'll become 1033 00:46:00,530 --> 00:46:02,990 better at, you know, security research, hacking, and so on. 1034 00:46:03,470 --> 00:46:06,770 Again, I don't think I can become, like, the world's best hacker or something, but 1035 00:46:06,850 --> 00:46:09,470 I think if I put in the hours, I put in the work, I can get, like, 1036 00:46:09,550 --> 00:46:09,970 decent. 1037 00:46:11,110 --> 00:46:12,710 So that's what I am good at. 1038 00:46:13,730 --> 00:46:17,150 What I am not good at is networking, fundraising, 1039 00:46:17,310 --> 00:46:18,390 persuading people. 1040 00:46:19,530 --> 00:46:21,730 Like, if you are good at those things, you know, 1041 00:46:21,850 --> 00:46:23,230 you will have a complementary fit. 1042 00:46:23,710 --> 00:46:27,130 Uh, if you can help me raise funding, for example, like, that would be a very 1043 00:46:27,190 --> 00:46:28,990 strong signal that you should be working with me. 1044 00:46:31,110 --> 00:46:34,370 If you are skilled as a hacker, again, you are welcome to work with me. 1045 00:46:34,570 --> 00:46:37,130 Like, anyone who's willing to work on this sort 1046 00:46:37,170 --> 00:46:38,550 of radical project is 1047 00:46:38,630 --> 00:46:42,410 going to be useful to me and also, well, ideally to you. 1048 00:46:42,450 --> 00:46:43,770 Like, you should also be doing this for 1049 00:46:43,810 --> 00:46:46,140 yourself, not just to appease 1050 00:46:46,370 --> 00:46:49,610 Samuel. Like, you should believe in leaking information. 1051 00:46:49,670 --> 00:46:51,450 You should believe that, okay, the world is ending. 1052 00:46:51,750 --> 00:46:53,830 Like, this has to come from within you. 1053 00:46:53,910 --> 00:46:54,510 I can't, you know, 1054 00:46:55,830 --> 00:46:58,550 convince... Well, maybe I can convince, but ultimately, like, 1055 00:46:58,560 --> 00:46:59,510 the drive to this has 1056 00:46:59,550 --> 00:47:01,450 to come from within. I want to work with people who 1057 00:47:01,490 --> 00:47:02,670 are self-motivated 1058 00:47:04,110 --> 00:47:06,150 and agentic and so on. 1059 00:47:09,450 --> 00:47:12,550 Uh, maybe a minor aside on how should our 1060 00:47:12,570 --> 00:47:13,430 OpSec work. 1061 00:47:13,510 --> 00:47:13,830 Like... 1062 00:47:18,850 --> 00:47:22,250 Yeah, this might seem like a tangent, but I think it also needs to be covered. 1063 00:47:22,630 --> 00:47:25,370 Uh, I think we need to have the ability to 1064 00:47:25,430 --> 00:47:26,510 keep at least something 1065 00:47:26,610 --> 00:47:29,310 secret. Like, we are getting information on our enemies. 1066 00:47:29,410 --> 00:47:31,510 We don't want to just leak everything we get. 1067 00:47:31,550 --> 00:47:33,090 Like, some of those things are actually private, 1068 00:47:33,130 --> 00:47:34,370 and we want to keep them private. 1069 00:47:34,450 --> 00:47:36,930 So some things we have to keep secret, and the rest we will leak. 1070 00:47:38,290 --> 00:47:40,790 Also, some of our methods, some of our capabilities, 1071 00:47:40,870 --> 00:47:42,050 how did we attack, that 1072 00:47:42,090 --> 00:47:43,330 also needs to be kept secret. 1073 00:47:44,510 --> 00:47:46,370 So these two things need to be secret a bit. 1074 00:47:46,710 --> 00:47:48,990 Rest remaining apart from this, I think it's fine if we 1075 00:47:49,010 --> 00:47:49,970 are public about a bunch of 1076 00:47:50,010 --> 00:47:53,590 stuff. Like, again, you can debate, argue, whatever with me, like, 1077 00:47:54,850 --> 00:47:56,410 uh, opinions vary on that. Uh, 1078 00:47:58,170 --> 00:48:02,090 now just as I think it is important we are able to keep some secrets, I 1079 00:48:02,110 --> 00:48:04,510 also think it will be difficult for us to keep secrets. 1080 00:48:04,550 --> 00:48:04,810 Like, 1081 00:48:06,670 --> 00:48:09,270 in general, if you go read about, you know, all the activists 1082 00:48:09,310 --> 00:48:09,860 and so on who have 1083 00:48:09,870 --> 00:48:12,610 worked on similar things, generally they have found it hard to keep 1084 00:48:12,670 --> 00:48:13,330 secrets even 1085 00:48:13,370 --> 00:48:14,150 though they had to. 1086 00:48:15,850 --> 00:48:18,550 And, like, that is generally my whole worldview. 1087 00:48:18,570 --> 00:48:20,950 Like, attacking people, getting their information is easy, 1088 00:48:21,290 --> 00:48:22,150 and defending your own 1089 00:48:22,210 --> 00:48:24,830 secrets is hard. That is why I'm saying let's go attack them, 1090 00:48:24,870 --> 00:48:25,610 get their secrets. 1091 00:48:25,730 --> 00:48:28,770 But on the flip side, that also means they can also attack us 1092 00:48:28,790 --> 00:48:29,330 and get all our 1093 00:48:29,370 --> 00:48:30,450 secrets. So, 1094 00:48:32,410 --> 00:48:34,590 like, that is just a fact about reality. 1095 00:48:34,670 --> 00:48:37,610 This is where the playing field looks like right now, where attack is easier and 1096 00:48:37,630 --> 00:48:40,490 defense is hard. Uh, 1097 00:48:42,870 --> 00:48:46,590 if we had, like, a large group of people, and then we actually, you know, somewhat 1098 00:48:46,670 --> 00:48:50,350 isolated from society, then I think we can keep some 1099 00:48:50,410 --> 00:48:53,270 secrets. We can, you know, remain psychologically healthy. 1100 00:48:53,350 --> 00:48:55,970 Like, the hard part of secrets is not just technical stuff. 1101 00:48:56,050 --> 00:48:58,230 The hard part is the effects of secrets on your psychology 1102 00:48:59,278 --> 00:49:00,598 Many people have written about this. 1103 00:49:00,758 --> 00:49:03,318 This is again a whole separate thesis I can get into. 1104 00:49:04,018 --> 00:49:07,638 But like, yeah, keeping secrets is hard because it's psychologically 1105 00:49:07,698 --> 00:49:10,458 costly. Like, especially if you think you're morally wrong in 1106 00:49:10,518 --> 00:49:11,218 keeping the secret, 1107 00:49:11,288 --> 00:49:13,078 then you are like done for. 1108 00:49:13,978 --> 00:49:14,198 Uh, 1109 00:49:15,898 --> 00:49:17,878 so we need to have strong moral justifications. 1110 00:49:17,938 --> 00:49:19,538 Okay, these are the things we are keeping secret. 1111 00:49:19,598 --> 00:49:21,238 These are the things we are leaking. This is why. 1112 00:49:21,298 --> 00:49:22,938 Like, we need to be clear in our own heads about 1113 00:49:22,998 --> 00:49:23,958 that so that we can remain 1114 00:49:23,978 --> 00:49:26,858 psychologically healthy. That is important. 1115 00:49:28,578 --> 00:49:32,428 And yeah, like at least at the start, once it's just me or one, 1116 00:49:32,738 --> 00:49:36,278 like two people, three people, like we are just not going to be able to keep 1117 00:49:36,478 --> 00:49:39,998 any secrets. Like that's unfortunate, but that's the reality. 1118 00:49:40,038 --> 00:49:43,538 Like once we have a lot more people, once we have money, competence, et cetera, 1119 00:49:43,658 --> 00:49:47,278 then we may be able to pull it off. But at the start, like keeping secrets 1120 00:49:47,307 --> 00:49:47,538 is going 1121 00:49:47,558 --> 00:49:49,858 to be hard even for us. Like not just for our enemies, 1122 00:49:49,918 --> 00:49:50,598 but also for us. 1123 00:49:53,238 --> 00:49:53,998 Okay. So 1124 00:49:55,078 --> 00:49:57,998 if you want to work with me, you can contact me on Signal. 1125 00:49:58,098 --> 00:49:59,738 My Signal username is available. 1126 00:50:00,918 --> 00:50:04,598 I do not think the risks are very high if you just have like a quick call with 1127 00:50:04,638 --> 00:50:04,818 me. 1128 00:50:05,158 --> 00:50:07,718 But if you actually work with me full-time, then yes, there 1129 00:50:07,758 --> 00:50:08,738 are significant risks 1130 00:50:08,778 --> 00:50:10,378 to you for sure, 100%. 1131 00:50:12,598 --> 00:50:15,038 Uh, if you want to actually work with me 1132 00:50:15,098 --> 00:50:16,538 full-time, like beyond just, you know, 1133 00:50:16,598 --> 00:50:19,688 first one or two calls, like I think the actual answer is, 1134 00:50:19,758 --> 00:50:20,238 you know, you have to 1135 00:50:20,278 --> 00:50:21,718 take a flight, you have to meet me in person. 1136 00:50:21,818 --> 00:50:23,298 I don't think there's any way to avoid that. 1137 00:50:23,398 --> 00:50:23,718 Like, 1138 00:50:24,878 --> 00:50:28,818 and once we are working together, we will also have to figure out a plan to 1139 00:50:28,838 --> 00:50:30,858 keep your loved ones safe. Like, 1140 00:50:32,638 --> 00:50:34,038 again, those are things we'll have to figure out 1141 00:50:34,078 --> 00:50:35,198 later, but they're important. 1142 00:50:35,348 --> 00:50:35,738 And 1143 00:50:37,478 --> 00:50:40,338 yeah, like we have to live in a country outside, 1144 00:50:40,398 --> 00:50:41,218 you know, US, UK, 1145 00:50:41,298 --> 00:50:45,078 Europe, and we have to stay outside and your social 1146 00:50:45,118 --> 00:50:47,668 circle has to also stay outside. And then we have to, you know, 1147 00:50:47,678 --> 00:50:48,098 work on this 1148 00:50:48,118 --> 00:50:50,658 full-time. Like that seems like the only way I think 1149 00:50:50,698 --> 00:50:51,858 we can actually pull this off. 1150 00:50:54,858 --> 00:50:58,618 Okay. So that was a 50-minute 1151 00:50:58,658 --> 00:51:01,038 video apparently. That was way longer than I thought. 1152 00:51:01,178 --> 00:51:03,778 Uh, this is my first take of the video, by the way. 1153 00:51:03,878 --> 00:51:07,818 I have not, you know, made multiple takes and I don't think I 1154 00:51:07,898 --> 00:51:09,987 will. Like I said, I am busy and, you know, 1155 00:51:10,017 --> 00:51:11,878 this plan will be outdated in six 1156 00:51:11,958 --> 00:51:14,598 months anyway. Like if you ask Samuel six months from now what 1157 00:51:14,638 --> 00:51:15,318 his plan is, it will 1158 00:51:15,358 --> 00:51:17,948 have been modified a fair bit anyway, you know. 1159 00:51:18,078 --> 00:51:19,618 So this is just my video on 1160 00:51:20,578 --> 00:51:23,818 as of what, 15 July 2026, you know, 1161 00:51:24,378 --> 00:51:27,958 here is my galaxy brain incomplete, possibly in-inaccurate 1162 00:51:28,218 --> 00:51:31,598 plan for what to do things. If you want to work with me on this 1163 00:51:31,658 --> 00:51:32,058 or something 1164 00:51:32,098 --> 00:51:32,908 similar to this, 1165 00:51:33,978 --> 00:51:35,918 like do reach out. Like, 1166 00:51:38,458 --> 00:51:40,518 yeah, just do reach out. Like 1167 00:51:41,598 --> 00:51:45,478 I am somewhat competent, I am very motivated, and I think we 1168 00:51:45,538 --> 00:51:47,398 can figure it out as we go along.